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THE POWER OF THE STATES TO MAKE COMPACTS
Recent noteworthy proposals" have been made concerning the con-
clusion by the states of compacts among themselves and with foreign
powers. Any adequate treatment of the subject must necessarily
include an investigation of the legal problems involved as well as objec-
tions from the standpoint of policy or expediency. Obstacles of a
constitutional nature may be encountered, varying with the form of the
particular agreement or compact; but such agreements are expressly
authorized on certain conditions, and this discussion will be directed to
objections that are deemed more vital and fundamental, having their
bases in the very nature of our political organization.
The federal Constitution provides that "no State shall enter into any
treaty, alliance, or confederation ;112 and that "no State shall, without
the consent of Congress . enter into any agreement or compact with
another State, or with a foreign power."
3  With respect to treaties,
'Report of the Committee on Inter-State Compacts to the National Conference
of Connissioners on Uniform State Laws. May I, 192I.
'Art. I, sec. io, clause I. 'Art. I, sec. io, clause 3.
[635]
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alliances, or confederations, the prohibition is absolute. The distinc-
tion which the framers of the Constitution intended to draw between
agreements unconditionally prohibited and those permitted with the
consent of Congress is not apparent from the language of the Constitu-
tion itself. Nor is aid to be derived from literature contemporary with
the Constitutional Convention. There was little or no discussion of
these two clauses while the Constitution was in the making, and the
question has never been judicially determined.4  Story maintained that
the terms treaty, alliance, and confederation applied to treaties of a
political character, such as "treaties of alliance for purposes of peace and
war; and treaties of confederation, in which the parties are leagued for
mutual government, political co-operation, and the exercise of political
sovereignty; and treaties of cession of sovereignty,' or conferring
internal political jurisdiction, or external political dependence, or
general commercial privileges." The terms "agreement" and "com-
pact" referred, in his opinion, to "private rights of sovereignty; such as
questions of boundary; interests in land situate in the territory of each
other; and other internal regulations for the mutual comfort and conve-
nience of states bordering on each other."5 Vattel seems to have been
of a substantially similar opinion concerning the general connotation of
these terms,6 although he did not consider them in connection with the
American Constitution. It is with "agreement or compact" that we
are chiefly concerned.
There seems to be no constitutional objection to an agreement between
two or more states concerning administrative problems with which they
are confronted, provided congressional consent is obtained. Indeed
many such agreements have been concluded, 7 the most recent being a
compact between New York and New Jersey for the purpose of develop-
ing their port facilities.8 Some state courts have held that there are
classes of agreements or compacts into which two or more states could
enter without the consent of Congress.9 It is difficult to reconcile the
reasoning in those cases with the explicit language of the Constitution
itself. The states are forbidden to "enter into any agreement or com-
42 Story, Commentaries on the Constitutiom of the United States (5th ed. 1891)
sec. 1402.
52 Story, op. cit. sec. 1403.
'Vattel, The Law of Nations (1792) secs. 152, 153, 154, 2o6.
Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of States With One Another and With
Foreign Powers (iq98) 2 MiNx. L. REv. 500, 515.
' Publi c Resolution-No. I7-67th Congress (S. J. Res. 88) approved August 23,
1921.
'Fisher v. Steele (1887) 39 La. Ann. 447, i So. 882; Union Branch Ry. v.
Tennessee & Georgia Ry. (1853) 14 Ga. 327; Dover v. Portsnwuth Bridge Co.
(1845) 17 N. H. 2oo. In these cases, the courts emphasized the fact that the
agreements under consideration were non-political in character. See also Virginia
v. Tennessee (1893) 148 U. S. 503, 13 Sup. Ct. 728; NoTEs (1922) 35 HARv. L.
R.EV. 322.
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pact" without the consent of Congress. Since it is definitely settled
that the congressional consent required by the Constitution may be
express or implied,' 0 it would have been more satisfactory to hold, in
those cases, that the consent of Congress was implied from its silent
acquiescence after the fact, and therefore that the compacts were valid.
This seems to be the only way in which to harmonize these state deci-
sions with the opinion of Chief Justice Taney in the leading case of-
Holmes v. Jennison," wherein he declared that the validity of all com-
pacts and agreements between the states and foreign countries is
conditional upon the assent of Congress. The Constitution makes no
distinction between inter-state agreements and agreements between the
states and foreign governments, and hence any agreement or compact,
not a treaty, alliance, or confederation would be valid, provided it is
approved by Congress.12  Assuming, therefore, the absence of any
constitutional objection to the formation of inter-state compacts and
compacts between the individual states and foreign countries, is there
any reason why such compacts should not be entered into ?13
'q Virginia v. Tennessee, supra note 9; Wharton v. Wise (1894) 153 U. S. 155,
14 Sup. Ct. 783.
"(1840, U. S.) 14 Pet. 540. The court was equally divided, Chief Justice Taney
and Justices McLean, Story, and Wayne being of the opinion that no agreement
without congressional consent would be valid. The precise point involved was
whether a state could enter into extradition arrangements with foreign states
without consent of Congress. The opinion of Chief Justice Taney was later
approved in United States v. Rauscher (1886) 119 U. S. 407, 414, 7 Sup. Ct. 234,
237. For a similar view, see Story, op. cit. sec. i4o3.
2 Green v. Biddle (1823, U. S.) 8 Wheat. i; Poole v. Fleeger (1837, U. S.)
ii Pet. 185; Wharton v. Wise, supra note IO; Crandall, Treaties (2d ed. 1916)
sec. 69; Barnett, International Agreements, Without the Advice and Consent of
the Senate (19o5) 15 YALE LAw JouRxAL, 18.
" The Committee on Inter-State Compacts seems to regard as especially desirable
the formation between the states and foreign countries of agreements concerning
uniform commercial laws, as, for example, the law of warehouse receipts. It
could hardly be dogmatically asserted that such agreements would not be "treaties"
within the meaning of that term as it is used in the clause of the Constitution
absolutely forbidding the states to enter into treaties, alliances, or confederations.
The term "treaty" seems incapable of exact definition. Mr. Justice Field declared
in Geofroy v. Riggs (189o) 133 U. S. 258, 267, 10 Sup. Ct 295, 297, that the
United States could enter into a treaty "touching any matter which is properly the
subject of negotiation with a foreign country." Applying this test to the subjects
concerning which it is proposed that the states conclude agreements with foreign
powers, it might be argued that the states would be precluded from making
agreements covering such of those subjects as are within the jurisdiction of the
Federal Government through its treaty-making power. Once that power is
admitted to cover a particular field, it would seem to follow that the states are
wholly excluded therefrom. See Baldwdn v. Franks (1887) i2o U. S. 678, 682, 7
Sup. Ct 656, 657.
Hence even if Congress gave the blanket authority desired, a constitutional
objection might still remain to prevent the exercise of the power. But some
agreements are not to be classed as treaties and the courts would probably be
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From the standpoint of policy there is obviously a vast difference
between interstate compacts and compacts between individual states and
foreign powers. Where compacts among the states would serve any
useful purpose,'4 it is believed that no serious objection could be urged
against them. The only question would be whether an inter-state agree-
ment offered the best solution of a particular problem, the answer
depending upon the special circumstances. One may reasonably doubt
whether, in most cases, the inter-state compact would accomplish the
desired end more satisfactorily than uniform legislative enactments
passed as a result of an investigation conducted by commissioners
appointed by the states concerned. Irrespective of any advantages or
disadvantages that may result from compacts among the states, how-
ever, it is believed that there are fatal objections to any system of com-
pacts or agreements between the individual states and foreign powers.
Of this latter class of agreements, history furnishes no example, and
one may express surprise at the enthusiasm with which they have
recently been advocated as the only solution of many of our foreign
problems.' 5 The absence of agreements between individual states of
reluctant to declare an agreement, denominated by Congress as a compact to be a
"treaty" and thus unconstitutional. Both points of view are perhaps plausible,
but it is evident that the practical difficulty of inducing Congress to consent to
agreements of real importance renders discussion of their constitutionality rather
academic.
No state has ever yet attempted to share the federal prerogative, and when the
interests of a considerable part of the country call for agreements with a foreign,
power covering a certain subject, that subject would seem to come within the field
restricted to the central government The tendency of the courts to construe
broadly the federal treaty-malting power seems to strengthen this view. See
NOTES (1919) 33 HARv. L. REv. 281; COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JoU!RNAL,
445; Missouri v. Halland (1920) 252 U. S. 416, 40 Sup. Ct. 382. No treaty has
ever been declared unconstitutional by any court, state or federal.
"' See the remarks of Professor Ernst Freund at p. 61 of the Report, supra
note i.
" On pages 27 and 28 of the Report, supra note i, it is asserted that: ".... it
is therefore absolutely necessary, for the future international self-respect of this
country, that this power (of the states to make compacts with foreign powers)
should be promptly exercised by the leading commercial States of the United
States." The accuracy of this statement may be questioned. It is submitted that
the treaty-making power of the United States is open to a much broader and more
effective use than appears to be supposed, and that it is altogether adequate to
enable this country to "share in world legislation" to such an extent as is desir-
able. See 5 Moore, International Law Digest (19o6) sec. 736; 2 Hyde, Inter-
national Law (1922) secs. 495-502. Concerning the scope of the federal power
to make treaties, the United States Supreme Court has said: "That the treaty
power extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and
the governments of other nations, is clear..... .The treaty power, as expressed
in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found
in that instrument against the action of the government or of its departments,
and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the
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the Union and foreign countries is attributable, not to ignorance of the
terms of the Constitution, but to a profound conviction of public policy.
At one time there existed conceptions of state rights which inevitably
resulted in an attempt to dissolve the Union; but even during that
period, when the states were perhaps more jealous of their own rights
than at any other time, we find no example of their entering the field of
foreign affairs. One may venture the opinion, therefore, that if this
clause of the Constitution were to be reformulated today, the phrase
"or with a foreign power" would be omitted entirely. The real reason
why we have not had compacts between the individual states and foreign
countries in the past is that such an expedient has been deemed
inherently subversive of our national unity, and inevitably productive of
an impression of paramount state right and of national inadequacy in
foreign affairs. In the conduct of foreign relations, national unity, both
in appearance and in reality, is a prime requisite. The inevitable result
of allowing the states to enter into conventional relations with foreign
powers would be the ultimate destruction of our national unity, both
real and apparent, and this proposal, therefore, irrespective of any merits
which, upon a superficial investigation, it may appear to have, should be
discarded as tending to subvert that great principle.
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE
The recent evolution of the doctrine of "imputed negligence" has
been a continuous struggle' by the courts to free themselves from a legal
anomaly which has in its favor hardly more than a respectable group of
seemingly important decisions.
Where an injured plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence sues
a defendant whose negligence helped to cause the injury to the plaintiff,
two conflicting lines of reasoning exist for permitting or denying a
recovery. (I) It is urged that the plaintiff should not be allowed to
recover because he should not benefit by his own wrong, and that the
public interest requires the prevention of carelessness by leaving each
negligent person to suffer the full extent of the harm resulting to him.
States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that .of
one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without
its consent. .... But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any
limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly
the subject of negotiation with a foreign country." Geofroy v. Riggs, stupra
note 13. It seems clear, therefore, that any matter concerning which concerted
action between a number of the states and a foreign country is admitted to be
desirable would be a proper subject of negotiation with a foreign power and hence
within the treaty-maklng power of the federal government.
'Wisconsin, the first American state to adopt the doctrine of imputing the
negligence of a driver to a passenger [Predeaux v. Mineral Point (1878) 43 Wis.
5131, is one of the latest states to reject it. Reiter v. Grober (192i) 173 Wis. 493,
I8I N. W. 739. See NoTEs (1921) i MicE. L. Rv. 858.
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(2) The contrary argument is that the plaintiff should be allowed to
recover, since he should not be the sole and only sufferer from the acci-
dent, being no more and probably less negligent than t.he defendant;
and that the public interest requires the prevention of carelessness by
penalizing the negligent defendant, who ought not to escape all responsi-
bility for his negligence simply because another, who was also negligent,
happens to be the plaintiff.
With the exception of cases in admiralty, 2 the courts have unani-
mously and correctly3 denied a recovery to a negligent plaintiff,4 because
of the first reason. The defendant escapes the payment of damages
not because he ought not to pay, but because the plaintiff ought not to
receive.5 There is, however, enough cogency in the second reason to
prevent the application of the general rule as against those who have not
personally been negligent although someone associated with them may
have been.
The recent California case of Dunbar v. San Francisco-Oakland
Terminal Rys. (1921, Calif.) 201 Pac. 33 o , held that the contributory
negligence of a husband while driving a vehicle, would be imputed to his
wife, who was riding with him. California has a community interest
statute, however, which creates in the husband and wife a relationship
in the nature of a partnership." Almost all courts now refuse to impute
the husband's negligence to his wife in such a case. Modern statutes
have generally given a married woman the capacity to sue and to own
property in her own name,7 with the result that the husband can not be
said to be benefiting by his wife's recovery. Neither should the
husband's negligence be imputed to the wife on the theory that the
husband was driving as the wife's agent, merely because of the marital
relationship.8 Thorogood v. Bryan,9 the first case to impute the negli-
'Hughes, Admiralty (2d ed. 1920) 312.
'But see Beasley, C. J., in Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hone (1896) 59
N. J. L. 275, 277, 35 At. 899, 9oo: ". . . . the legal doctrine that bars a party
injured by the unintentional misconduct of another by reason of his having himself
been, in a measure, the occasion of the resulting damage, is rather an artificial rule
of law than a principle of justice, for its effect generally is to cast the entire loss
ensuing from the joint fault upon one of the culpable parties, and oftentimes upon
him who is but little to blame."
' The law of contributory negligence is always limited by the "last clear chance"
rule, and if the defendant had the last chance to avoid the accident the plaintiff
will be allowed. to recover, even though he was also negligent. Butterfield v.
Forrester (18o9, K. B.) ii East, 6o. See COmmENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 896. Thus the contribfitory negligence rule is in part nullified by the
skilful use of language relating to proximate cause.
'(1916) I So. L. QgA~R. 154.
' Tiffany, Domestic Relations (3d ed. 1921) i5o; see also Evans, Community
Obligations (1922) IO CALIF. L. REv. 120.
1 Schouler, Donestic Relations (1921) 382; I Mechem, Agency (1914) 121.
8 1 Mechem, loc. cit.
" (1849, C. P.) 8 C. B. 114.
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gence of a driver to a passenger, even though he had no control, has
been repudiated in England ° and in every jurisdiction in this country
except Michigan.1
The non-imputability rule, in the case of an infant child, injured by
the negligence of its parent concurring with that of the defendant, has
not received such unanimous support.1 2  The New York case of Hart-
field v. Roper 3 originated the rule, in this country, of imputing the
negligence of the father to the child. There the child, who brought the
action, was denied a recovery because of the negligence of its father, on
the theory that the father was the agent for the child's care. This
theory, if carried to a logical conclusion, shows its own fallacy in that
as principal the child would be held liable for the tort or breach of
contract of its father. An ex post facto reason now given for the rule
of Hartfield v. Roper is that while the damages recovered belong tech-
nically to the child's separate estate they will, as a practical matter, go
to the parent, and thus there will accrue a substantial benefit to a party
whose negligence helped cause the damage.'
4 But the law does not
recognize the right of the parent to money recovered by the infant.'
5
If, however, the parent may so manipulate the money received as to
secure personal benefit from it, such a result should be prevented by
action against him rather than avoided by denying compensation to the
child.
When the father or husband sues for the loss of services of a child
or wife guilty of contributory negligence and he, the father or husband,
is not at fault, the cases, few in number, impute the negligence of the
child or wife to the plaintiff.' 6 It is submitted that these cases are not
sound. The right of the father or husband to damages for the loss of
"0 The Bernina (1887, C. A.) L. R. 12 Prob. Div. 58.
'NOTES (1921) ig MIcH. L. REv. 858; but see Jewell v. Rogers Tp. (1919)
208 Mich. 318, 175 N. W. 151.
'The following states still impute the father's negligence to the child: Dela-
ware, Kyne v. Wilmington & N. Ry. (1888) 8 Del. 185, 14 Atl. 922; Indiana,
Evansville, etc. Ry. v. Wolf (1877) 59 Ind. 89; Kansas, Atchison, etc. Ry. v.
Smith (1882) 28 Kan. 541; Maine, Morgan v. Aroostook Valley Ry. (1916) 115
Me. 171, 98 Atl. 628; Maryland, Baltimore, etc. Ry. v. McDonnell (1875) 43 Md.
534; Massachusetts, Sullivai; v. Chadwick (1920) 236 Mass. 130, 127 N. E. 632;
Minnesota, Fitzgerald v. St. Paul Ry. (1882) 29 Minn. 336, 13 N. W. 168; New
York, Hartfield v. Roper (1839, N. Y.) 21 Wend. 6,5; McGarry v. Loomis
(1875) 63 N. Y. io4; Manion v. Richmond Ice Co. (9o9) 133 App. Div. 254, 117
N. Y. Supp. 353.
"Supra note 12.
See Gilmore, Imputed Negligence (I921) i Wis. L. REv. 193, 2oi.
"Tiffany, op. cit. sec. 140; 1 Schouler, op. dt. sec. 738; (1917) 65 U. PA. L.
REv. 382, 385. When the parent receives such funds he is regarded as holding
them in trust for the infant. Bedford v. Bedford (i8gi) 136 Ill. 354, 26 N. E.
662.
1" Winner v. Oakland Tp. (1893) 158 Pa. 405, 27 Ati. 1111; Chicago, B. & Q.
Ry. v. Honey (1894, C. C. A. 8th) 63 Fed. 39; Wueppesahl v. The Conn. Co.
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services of his child or wife is entirely distinct and separate from the
right of the child or wife to recover for injuries.'7 Had the defendant
alone been negligent he would have to pay damages to the child or wife
for loss of services or consortium. Because of the rule of contributory
negligence the defendant is not liable in an action by the child or wife,
not because he ought not to pay, but because they ought not to receive.
When, however, the non-negligent parent or husband brings his action
for loss of services, the courts are called upon to decide which of two
parties, one innocent and the other negligent, should be preferred.
There seems no logic or justice in invoking the fiction of imputed negli-
gence in such a case, and the plaintiff ought to recover.
If the child or wife dies because of injuries due in part to their
contributory negligence, and the father or husband brings an action for
wrongful death under a statute modeled on Lord Campbell's Act, he
can not recover. 8 This, however, is because of an express limitation
in the statute allowing an action to the beneficiary only if the deceased
could have recovered had he lived, and not because of any imputation of
negligence.
Where the negligence of the father or husband contributes to the
death of the child or wife, and he brings an action under a death statute,
the cases are in conflict.19 Such an action, however, depends entirely
upon the interpretation of the statute in the particular jurisdiction and
there is no question of imputed negligence." In cases of bailor and
bailee, the negligence of the bailee is generally not imputed to the
bailor. 21  The negligence of an employee is not imputed to a co-
employee.22  The negligence of one member of a joint enterprise will
be imputed to the other on the ground of agency. Whether a partic-
(1913) 87 Conn. 71o, 89 Atl. 166; Burke v. Broadway, etc. Ry. (1867, N. Y. Sup.Ct) 49 Barb. 529; contra, Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Brick (1892) 83 Tex. 526, 20
S. W. 511.
i Schouler, op. cit. secs. 677, 757.
(1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 103;" see Gilmore, op. cit. i Wis. L. REv. 198.
19 (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, io3; see collection of cases, 18 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 328, note.
"For a discussion of this point and also imputation of negligence if there are
several beneficiaries, see (1914) 1 VA. L. Rav. 318.
'Fischer v. Internatlonal Ry. (192o, Sup. Ct) 112 Misc. 212, 182 N. Y. Supp.
313 (negligence of borrower of an automobile not imputed to the owner) ; Bower
v. Union Pac. Ry. (1920) lO6 Kan. 404, 188 Pac. 42o (negligence of carrier not
imputed to shipper) ; Lloyd v. Northern Pae. Ry. (1919) 1O7 Wash. 57, 181 Pac.
29; N. Y., etc. Ry. v. N. f. Electric Co. (1897) 6o N. J. L. 338, 38 AtI. 828;
Currie v. Consolidated Ry. (i9o8) 81 Conn. 383, 71 Atl. 356; Sea Ins. Co. of
Liverpool v. Vicksburg (19o8, C. C. A. 5th) 159 Fed. 676; contra, Welty v.
Indianapolis Ry. (1886) 105 Ind. 55, 4 N. E. 410; Moore v. Stetson (19o2) 96
Me. 197, 52 Atl. 767; Ill. Cent. Ry. v. Sims (1900) 77 Miss. 325, 27 So. 527.
'Ratcliff v. Mexico Power Co. (1918, Mo. App.) 203 S. W. 232; Stoker v.
Tri-LCity Ry. (1917) 182 Iowa, 1O9O, 165 N. W. 30; Siever v. Pittsburg, C. C. &
St. L. Ry. (1916) 252 Pa. 1, 97 Atl. 1x6.
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ular enterprise is joint, so as to make one party the agent of the other,
is a question of fact to be decided in each particular case.
23
It may be advisable then, to lay down the rule that contributory
negligence should never be imputed; that is, if A sues B to recover
damages suffered by A because of B's negligence, the contributory
negligence of C should not be imputed to A. In the case of principal
and agent, recognizing imputed negligence as a fiction, the negligence
of the agent may nevertheless prevent recovery by the principal for
the general reasons underlying the maxim respondeat superior. This
exception should be recognized only in cases of express and unequivocal
agencies, and the agency relationship should never be implied in order
to apply the fiction of imputed negligence. The instant case, because
of a community-interest statute creating a partnership between a
husband and wife in relation to their property, falls within this one
exception to the rule that the contributory negligence of another should
never be imputed to the plaintiff.2 4 The doctrine of imputed negli-
gence is fast losing ground and should soon be of only academic and
historical interest. It is to be hoped that the jurisdictions still clinging
to it will soon fall in line with the majority, and will impute negligence
only in cases where an express and unequivocal agency exists.
BUSINESS CO-OPERATION, THE "'OPEN COMPETITION PLAN," AND THE
SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT
A new form of business association known as the "open competition
plan" or "open price association" has again raised the question of
what is restraint of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act.1
The asserted object of such associations is to eliminate "cut throat"
competition and to enable their members to conduct their business more
scientifically, with a sounder knowledge of trade conditions. The
members contribute to a central bureau complete information about
their business, such as. the amount of sales, stock on hand, price lists,
etc. These reports are then consolidated by an expert appointed by
the association and sent out to the members. The frequency of reports
and the details required vary in different associations, but the purpose
is similar.2 It may be easily seen that such an organization has a
potential power to limit supply and fix prices, if sufficient co-operation
or coercion exists among the members. The Supreme Court of the
"As to what constitutes a joint enterprise see (i9z8) 27 YALE LAW Joui AL,
565; (1920) 5 IowA L. BuL. x2i.
"Each partner is a general agent for the other. Gilmore, Partnership (i91i)
274.
, Act of July 2, x89o (26 Stat at L. 209).
'For a discussion of the formation, organization, and actual operation of such
associations, see Naylor, Trade Associations (i921). For a radical viewpoint
supporting such associations see Eddy, The New Competition (1912).
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United States has recdntly held such an association illegal under the
Sherman Act, as an undue restraint of trade, in the case of American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States (1921) 42 SuD. Ct. 114.
That competition is the life of trade and a necessity for the best
economic interests of the community as a whole seems to be a generally
accepted principle in law. It is not easy to determine what facts consti-
tute an unlawful restraint of trade and competition, either at common
law or under our numerous state and federal statutes. Agreements, the
sole purpose of which was the suppression of competition, have nearly
always been held to be unenforceable, irrespective of the degree of suc-
cess in attaining the object and of the number and the power of the
parties to the agreement. Thus pools among competitors made to regu-
late output, sales, and profits, 3 agreements dividing territory,4 and con-
tracts for the fixing of uniform prices 5 have been held illegal at common
law:8 Where the restraining agreement is merely auxiliary to a con-
tract with other and lawful purposes, it will be held to be valid if the
restraint is regarded as reasonable. The "rule of reason," later
applied by the Supreme Court of the United States in construing the
Sherman Act, originated in this line of cases.7 Its historical develop-
ment need not be traced here.
'Emery v. Ohio Candle Co. (189o) 47 Ohio St. 320, 24 N. E. 66o; India
Bagging Assoc. v. B. Kock & Co. (859) 14 L a. Ann. 164; contra, Skranika v.
Scharinghauen (188o) 8 Mo. App. 522 (where in fact there was no monopoly).
" Ain. Laundry Co. v. E. & W. Dry Cleaning Co. (917) igg Ala. 154, 74 So.
58. See note in Corbin, Cases on Contracts (3923) 1239; but see contra, Wickans
v. Evans (1829, Exch.) 3 You. & Jerv. 318, 329. Cf. also National Benefit Co. v.
Union Hospital Co. (1891) 45 Minn. 272, 47 N. W. 8o6; Fairbanks v. Leary
(1876) 40 Wis. 637.
'Nester v. Continental Brewing Co. (1894) 161 Pa. 473, 29 At. 1O2; Morris
Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. (1871) 68 Pa. 173; but see Dolph v. Troy
Laundry Machinery Co. (1886, C. C. N. D. N. Y.) 28 Fed. 553.
Such a rule has been applied to agreements between skilled laborers to maintain
standard wages. More v. Bennett (1892) 140 Ill. 69, 29 N. E. 888. No such
general rule would be enforced against laborers and labor unions to-day. Anson,
Contract (Corbin's ed. 1gig) sec. 259a; 3 Williston, Contracts (1g2o) sec. 1655.
'Inasmuch as the Sherman Anti-Trust Law and the various state anti-trust
laws were all passed to strengthen the prohibitions of the common law, all of the
agreements in the preceding notes would be forbidden by statute. See Shute v.
Shute (1918) 176 N. C. 462, 97 S. E. 392; Love v. Kozy Theater (1923, Ky.)
236 S. W. 243.
" See Mitchell v. Reynolds (373H, K. B.) i P. Wins. I8I. As regards contracts
the rule is well expressed: "If, considered with reference to the situation, business
and objects of the parties, and in the light of all the surrounding circumstances
with reference to which the contract was made, the restraint contracted for appears
to have been for a just and honest purpose, for the protection of the legitimate
interests of the party in whose favor it is imposed, reasonable as between them and
not specially injurious to the public, the restraint will be held valid." Hubbard v.
Miller (1873) 27 Mich. 15, 39; cf. Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber (1887) io6
N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419. See Kales, Contracts and Combinations in Restraint of
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The development of the common-law rules was substantially the
same in England and the United States, if we exclude certain minority
views. Those rules made the unreasonable contract unenforceable, but
did not otherwise penalize the parties for making it. In the United
States however numerous anti-trust statutes have been passed, declaring
various agreements and combinations to be crimes, creating remedies in
tort actions in favor of injured competitors, and authorizing injunctions
at the instance of both individuals and the government.8
Another factor that has become involved in the problem in the United
States has been that of unfair competition,9 usually considered as evi-
dencing an intention to monopolize, and when coupled with a power to
do so, deemed an overt act towards that end. In itself it is illegeal,
although difficult of precise definition.10
In determining the illegality of organizations under anti-trust acts
in criminal prosecutions or dissolution suits, a more liberal application
of the rule of reason is found. The question concerns not merely the
enforceability of the contract or of a restrictive covenant auxiliary to a
lawful contract by the parties thereto; rather it is a case of the organ-
ization against the public, and it requires a balancing of the public bene-
fit in having successful business organizations with the public detriment
in having such organizations become oppressive. The shift from small
to large economic units is an established fact, and it has gravely affected
the economic policies of courts and legislatures. No doubt the form of
the restraining agreement, combination, or trust will occasionally
affect the question of the legality of the organization, but for the pur-
pose of this discussion distinctions of this kind will be disregarded."
Trade (1918) chs. I, 2, 3; Jones, The Trust Problem in the United States (1921)
300, 301.
'See Macrosty, Trust Movement in British Industry (19o7) 18-23; Levy, The
Sherman Law & English Doctrine (1920) 6 CoRN. L. QuART. 36, 45. Cf. Mog1
Case (1889, C. A.) L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 598, and Thomsen v. Cayser (1917) :243
U. S. 66, 37 Sup. Ct. 353. See (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 139. For a discus-
sion of the English doctrine as applied to labor cases, see COMMENTS (1922) 31
YALE LAW JOURNA, 539; for the American doctrine, see NOTES (1922) 35
HARv. L. REV. 459.
'In its broader and modern meaning, not in the narrow sense of fraud, passing
off one's goods or business for that of another. See, Stevens, Unfair Competition
(1917) 1-9; Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition (igIg) 29 YALE LAW
JouRNAL, 1, 15, 18. For the common law on unfair competition, see Federal Trade
Commission, Memoranda on Unfair Competition at the Common Law (1916).
"0 See supra note 9; the Clayton Act of Oct. 15, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 730) defines
certain acts as unfair. See also the Federal Trade Commission Act of Sept. 26,
1914 (38 Stat. at L. 717) ; see NoTz, New Phrases of Unfair Competition, National
and International (1920) 30 YALE LAW JouRNAL,. 384; Notz, American Foreign
Trade (1921) chs. 5-7.
' For a clear exposition of the various kinds of agreements see Jones, op. cit. ch.
2; Macrosty, op. cit. 4-18.
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As the rule of reason has been adopted by the Supreme Court in
construing the Sherman Act,'2 and generally by the state courts in con-
struing similar state statutes, 8 it is necessary to examine the facts of
each case in order to obtain even an indefinite idea of what constitutes
an illegal organization. The cases seem to show (i) that where there
has been a preponderance of size of the organization in the field it
served, unfair methods used, and attempted control over prices and
production, the organization was illegal;14 (2) that Wvhere there has
been a preponderance of size of the organization in the field it served,
no unfair methods used, but overt acts evidencing an intention to
monopolize, such as price fixing or limiting production, the majority of
the courts have held the combination illegal; but where there has seemed
to be no intention to monopolize, or actual harm to the public, several
decisions have held it legal.'5 It is practically impossible to classify
"Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States (igii) 221 U. S. 1, 67,
68, 31 Sup. Ct. 502, 518, 519. For a review of the Supreme Court decisions,
see Jones, op. cit. ch. 17; Kales, op. cit. ch. 8.
" For a collection of state statutes, see Haines, op. cit. 29 YALE LAw JouRNAL,
1o, ii; see cases cited infra notes 14, I5; Joyce, Monopolies (1911) chs. 17, 24.
"
4 State v. Adams Lumber Co. (19o8) 81 Neb. 392, 116 N. W. 302; Standard
Oil Co. v. United States (1911) 221 U. S. I, 31 Sup. Ct. 502; United States v.
Keystone Watch Case Co. (1915, E. D. Pa.) 218 Fed. 5o2; United States v.
Eastman Kodak Co. (1915, W. D. N. Y.) 226 Fed. 62; United States v. King
(i9i6, D. Mass.) 25o Fed. 9o8; Belfi v. United States (igi, C..C. A. 3d) 259
Fed. 822; Thomsen v. Cayser (1917) 243 U. S. 66, 37 Sup. Ct. 353; United
States v. Associated Bill Posters (igi6, N. D. Ill.) 235 Fed. 54o; Swift & Co. v.
United States (19o5) 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct 276; United States v. American
Tobacco Co. (1911) 221 U. S. io6, 31 Sup. Ct 632; Standard Sanitary Manu-
facturing Co. v. United States (I912) 226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9; United States
v. Reading Co. (1912) 226 U. S. 324, 33 Sup. Ct 9o; United States v. Inter-
national Harvester Co. (1914, D. Minn.) 214 Fed. 987; United States v. Corn
Products Refining Co. (igi6, S. D. N. Y.) 234 Fed. 964; Connors v. Connolly
(913) 86 Conn. 641, 86 At . 60o; see Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering
(1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172.
"Illegal: People v. Sheldon (1893) 139 N. Y. 251, 34 N. E. 785; Hooker &
Woodward v. Vandewater (1847, N. Y.) 4 Denio, 349; Morris Run Coal Co. v.
Barclay Coal Co. (1871) 68 Pa. I73; United States v. New England Fish
Exchange (1919, D. Mass.) 258 Fed: 732; Pulpwood Co. v. Green Bay Paper &
Fiber Co. (1919) 168 Wis. 400, 17o N. W. 230; United States v. Reading Co.
(920) 253 U. S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct. 425 (but see three dissenting opinions) ; State v.
People's Ice Co. (i912) 246 Mo. 168, 151 S. W. xoi; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
v. U. S. (1899) 175 U. S. 211, 2o Sup. Ct. 96; see Brent v. Gay (1912) 149 Ky.
615, 149 S. W. 915; Reeves v. Decorah Farners' Co-op (1913) i6o Iowa, 194,
14o N. W. 844; Pond Creek Coal Co. v. Riley Lester & Bros. (1916) 171 Ky.
81I, 188 S. W. 9o7; Love v. Kozy Theater Co. (1921, Ky.) 236 S. W. 243.
Legal: United States v. American Can Co. (1916, D. Md.) 23o Fed. 859;
United States v. Prince Line (915, S. D. N. Y.) 220 Fed. 230; Lumberinen's
Trust Co. v. Title Ins. & Inv. Co. of Tacoma (1918, C. C. A. 9th) 248 Fed. 213
(a reasonable combination to'save the companies; intention stressed); State v.
Duluth Board of Trade (igo9) 107 Minn. 5o6, 121 N. W. 395 (reasonable regula-
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cases involving neither preponderant size nor the use of unfair methods.
However, the greatest stress seems to be laid on intention; and where
the court feels that the organization primarily aims to stifle competi-
tion' 6 as contrasted with a purpose of avoiding financial disaster, 7 it
has refused to sanction the agreement. Where prime necessities were
involved the courts seem to have been stricter, although such a distinc-
tion is generally repudiated.' There is also some authority to the
effect that power to control prices and a use of the power detrimental
to the public must be shown.'" Under American statutes size is import-
ant, but alone is not enough to render a combination illegal,2 0 though
tions of a grain exchange) ; United States v. Board of Trade of Chicago (1918)
246 U. S. 231, 38 Sup. Ct. 242 (a fixed price established, by rule, for part of day
was reasonable for conduct of grain exchange). In the last two cases at least
local monopolies exercised certain restraints, but the circumstances were such that
the reasonableness of the restraint could easily be proved to the court. See also
Anaheim Citrus Fruit Assoc. v. Yeonan (1921, Calif. App.) 197 Pac. 959 (must
show the illegal intention to fix prices).1 Recou v. Crosland (1921, Fla.) 88 So. 38o. Here A and B, rivals, combined.
Although there seemed to be no evidence of intention to monopolize, the court held
the contract illegal on the ground that it got rid of competition. Two judges
dissented. See Joyce, Monopolies (1911) secs. 61, 67.
In the above case and the cases cited infra note 17, the question of the legality
of the contract under the anti-trust acts was involved rather than the legality of an
organization. What might be called an "embryo association" existed.1 Kohart v. Skow (1914) 163 App. Div. 899, 147 N. Y. Supp. 509. Here A and
B agreed to fix prices in order to end a ruinous competition. The court supported
it as reasonable. See also Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Garst (1895) 18 R. I. 484, 28 Atl.
973; Lumbernen's Trust Co. v. Title Ins. & Inv. Co., supra note 15.
'Ford v. Chicago Milk Shipper's Assoc. (1895) z55 Ill. I66, 39 N. E. 651;
State v. Erickson (19og) 54 Wash. 472, 103 Pac. 796. For a review of the early
authorities see Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States (1898, C. C. A. 6th)
85 Fed. 271, opinion by Justice Taft.
"United States v. Nelson (1892, D. Minn.) 52 Fed. 646. Lumber dealers agreed
to raise prices. The court sustained a demurrer to the indictment holding that
power to control prices must be shown. People v. Baff (1917, Co. Ct.) 99 Misc.
684, 166 N. Y. Supp. 136 (must shov that defendants dominated trade); United
States v. United States Steel Corp. (1920) 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293 (size
alone not illegal, must be misuse of power. Three justices dissenting); see
United States v. International Harvester Co. (1914, D. Minn.) 214 Fed. 987,
dissenting opinioft of Judge Sanborn at p. ioio. See also cases cited supra note 15
where the size was preponderant and the organization legal.
" See State v. Adams Lumber Co., supra note 14; Belfi v. United States, supra
note 14; United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., supra note 14; United States v.
Keystone Watch Case Co., supra note 14; Uoited States v. American Can Co.,
supra note 15; Anaheim Citrus Fruit Assoc. v. Yeoman, supra note 15; United
States v. United States Steel Corp., supra note ig. But see contra, Slaughter v.
Thacker Coal & Coke Co. (1904) 55 W. Va. 642, 47 S. E. 247 (power is the
test); Pulpwood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., supra note 15 (power
used) ; State v. People's Ice Co., supra note 15 (rule of reason rejected) ; People
v. Sheldon, supra note 15 (preponderant size makes association prima facie
illegal); Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., supra note 15 (power suffi-
cient).
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little other evidence of intention to monopolize is necessary to make
it So. 2 1
Such seems to have been the general state of the law when the "open
competition plan" first came before the courts. In the instant case the
association was open to all. Its members controlled about one third of
the output of the lumber mills of the country. No unfair methods were
used against third parties. The secretary of the central bureau, how-
ever, sent out advice as to future market conditions and strongly recom-
mended limiting production. This advice was followed to some extent.
Prices increased from 33% to over 2oo in some cases, but were not
uniform in all parts of the country. A copy of each report was filed
with the government. Meetings open to all were held by the members,
at which trade conditions were discussed. The lower court enjoined
the association from sending out reports or discussing present or future
prices at their meetings.
The Supreme Court,22 in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Clarke,
held that the scheme was merely the old "gentleman's agreement" to
fix prices in a new disguise; thaf there was at least moral coercion by
the stronger members of the association on the weaker, which tended
to enforce the agreement; that the bureau was the instrument which
enforced this coercion; that consequently there was illegal restraint
of trade.2 3  On the other hand, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a dissenting
opinion, could not find either coercion on members or third parties, an
established monopoly, a division of territory, or unreasonable restraint.
24
The majority opinion emphasized the detailed reports on future produc-
tion, the strong advice in the reports sent to the members, the sanction
of "financial interest, intimate personal contact, and business honor,
all operating under the restraint of exposure of what would be deemed
' See cases cited supra note 20. For a discussion of the judicial view of the
size of a corporation see Kales, op. cit. ch. 5.
'Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and McKenna dissented. For a complete state-
ment of facts see the opinion of the lower court (192O, W. D. Tenn.) 263 Fed. 147.
'Mr. Justice Clarke said in part: "Genuine competitors do not make daily,
weekly and monthly reports of the minutest details of a business to their
rivals.... ." (at p. 120)
"The plan is, essentially, simply an expansion of the gentleman's agreement of
former days. . . ." "And to rely for maintenance of concerted action in both
respects not on fines and forfeitures as in earlier days, but upon what experience
has shown to be the more potent and dependable restraints, of business honor and
social penalties. . . ." (at p. 121.) Mr. Justice Clarke also mentioned that the
article involved was of prime necessity. As a rule courts do not make a distinc-
tion on this basis. See supra note 18.
" Mr. Justice Brandeis said in part: "Restraint of trade may be exerted upon
rivals; upon buyers or upon sellers; upon employers or employed. Restraint may
be exerted through force or fraud or agreement It may be exerted through moral
or legal obligations; through fear or through hope;. . . . Words of advice,
seemingly innocent and perhaps benevolent, may restrain, when uttered under
circumstances that make advice equivalent to command. For the essence of
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bad faith and of trade punishment by powerful rivals," and the effect
of the plan as shown by the rise in prices. The minority opinion
stressed the lack of a dominant position in the industry, the lack of uni-
formity in the prices, and the effect of post-war conditions on prices in
general, the trade advantage to the small mill owner, especially in the
"back woods" districts, the economic advantage in that it prevented
over-production, and the substitution of knowledge for ignorance in
conducting one's business. In brief, the majority thought the restraint
unreasonable, the minority thought it reasonable, or non-existent, in the
last analysis a difference of opinion on an economic question.
25
It would seem that the association might have been supported under
existing law. Prices in themselves are not important. Lowering a
price will not protect an organization otherwise illegal .2  There must
be power to control prices and an intention to exercise that power. It
is somewhat doubtful whether such a power existed in this case. At
least the association was not dominant. Undoubtedly a certain element
of coercion or moral suasion exists between the members of such an
association. Yet no extrinsic evidence of it was shown unless letters
approving the plan because of improvement in the individual's business
can be construed as such. Even if there was a definite agreement
between the members regulating prices, would such an association be
illegal when not preponderant or using unfair methods against third
parties? As Mr. Justice Brandeis demonstrated, if the members had
consolidated into one concern, the resulting corporation would have
been legal under recent Supreme Court decisions, still assuming it did
not use unfair methods against third parties. 7 Even when a complete
local monopoly existed, price regulation has been permitted to a cer-
tain extent.
28
The decision seems to be a backward step from the recent tendencies
of the courts and the legislatures. 2' The essence of the opinion is that
restraint is power; and power may arise merely out of position. Wherever a
dominant position has been attained, restraint necessarily arises." (at p. 121.)
Further on he said: "The Sherman Law does not prohibit every lessening of
competition; and it certainly does not command that competition shall be pursued
blindly .... " (at p. 122.)
And again: "It may be that the distribution of trade data, editorial comments
and the conferences enabled the producers to obtain, on the average, higher
prices.... The illegality of a combination under the Sherman Law lies, not in
its effect upon price level but in the coercion thereby affected." (at p. 123.)
"For a discussion of the instant case see (1921) 54 Crlc. LEG. NEws, 181.
" See Slaughter v. Thacker Coal Coke Co. (1904) 55 W. Va. 642, 47 S. E. 247;
Harding v. American Glucose Co. (1899) 182 Ill. 551, 55 N. E. 577; Central Ohio
Salt Co. v. Guthrie (i88o) 35 Ohio St. 666.
United States v. U. S. Steel Corp. (1920) 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct 293.
See State v. Duluth Board of Trade, supra note 15; United States v. Board
of Trade of Chicago, supra note 15.
"See Steele, The Sherman Law: Its Past and Future (1921) 6 CoRN. L.
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the public interest requires blind competition, at least so far as knowl-
edge of future transactions is concerned. The giving of advice based
on reports of future plans of the members was probably the final weight
in tipping the scale. If no such plan is conducted and each individual
member is forced to rely on his own judgment in interpreting the
reports of past transactions, the activities of such an association may be
permitted.30
Today's business requires scientific management and should not be
forced to grope in the dark. The test to be applied to business methods
can only be determined by the results of past regulation measured by
economic standards. A laissez-faire policy is indeed attractive unless
we can foresee a certainty of injury to those primarily to be considered
in protective measures.
PRICE MAINTENANCE AND THE BEECHNUT DECISION
In Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co. (1922) 42
Sup. Ct. 150, the Supreme Court sustained the authority of the Federal
Trade Commission to issue an order requiring a manufacturer to desist
from carrying out a certain plan of resale of its branded products by
which standard prices were maintained. In pursuance of this plan the
company let it be generally known that it would refuse to sell to any
jobbers, wholesalers, or retailers who failed to observe the resale prices
specified, and devised an elaborate system to ascertain what dealers were
not complying. The Federal Trade Commission condemned this as an
unfair method of competition within the meaning of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act." There was no suggestion that the
defendant had any sort of monopoly in the kinds of products which it
manufactured.
QUAur. 217, 234; Notz, The Webb-Pomerene Law (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
29; Levy, The Sherman Law and the English Doctrine (192o) 6 CORN. L. QUART.
36, 45.
" United States v. American Linseed Co. (i921, N. D. Ill.) 275 Fed. 939. The
facts are similar except that no advice or future predictions as to market conditions
were given. The association was held legal in the lower court under the Sherman
Act See comment on case (1921) 54 Cmlc. LEG. NEWS, 125.
'Act of Sept 26, 1914, ch. 311, sec. 5 (38 Stat at L. 719). "That Act declares
unlawful 'unfair methods of competition' and gives the Commission authority
afteir hearing to make orders to compel the discontinuance of such methods. What
shall constitute unfair methods of competition denounced by the Act is left without
specific definition." From the principal case, 42 Sup. Ct at p. 154.
"It is clear that this, like the Sherman Act, merely operates as a general license
to the federal courts, when cases-are presented within the federal jurisdictional
subject of interstate and foreign commerce, to declare or make the law as to what
are illegal methods of competition and what are not, according to the usage cus-
tomarily adopted by common law courts, i. e., by applying the rule of reason."
Kales, Contracts & Combinations it Restraint of Trade (1918) 14o; see also
Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition (IgIg) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, I.
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The Supreme Court's decisions on the subject of resale price mainte-
nance by a manufacturer who distributes his products through jobbers,
wholesalers, and retailers, may be briefly summarized as follows:
i. A manufacturer who sells his products to dealers with contracts
or agreements that specified resale prices shall be observed cannot
enforce them and has no remedy against the dealer or against third
parties who knowingly procure a breach. Such contracts are void
as against public policy. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co. 2
2. A manufacturer who sells his products to dealers without con-
tracts or agreements as to resale prices is not guilty of an offence under
the Sherman Act,3 prohibiting monopolies, contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of interstate commerce, where he merely indi-
cates his wishes as to resale prices and announces that he will not sell to
any distributor who fails to observe them. He has the undoubted privi-
lege of refusing to deal with anyone who does not comply, although
this results in the maintenance of the desired price. An indictment
which fails to charge the making of any agreement, express or implied,
importing an obligation to observe such prices, is therefore demurrable.
United States v. Colgate & Co.4
3. But a manufacturer who sells his products to dealers with con-
tracts or agreements as to resale prices (void though they are) is guilty
of an offence under the Sherman Act. Such contracts or agreements
need not be express but may be implied from a course of dealing or
other circumstances. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc.5
An agreement may not, however, be inferred from the mere fact that
the manufacturer has indicated a sales plan fixing minimum resale
prices, in the maintenance of which the dealers actually co-operate,
whether from choice or from fear of being cut off from the list of
dealers. Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Company.6
4. Finally, in the instant case, it has been held that a manufacturer
may be guilty of unfair methods of competition under the Federal
Trade Commission Act (the same principles of public policy applying as
in cases under the Sherman Act7 ) in the absence of any contract or
agreement, express or implied, where for the purpose of maintaining
standard resale prices he has systematically refused to sell to dealers who
have not observed those suggested.
The original announcement, in the Miles case, of the Supreme
Court's view that contracts for the maintenance of uniform resale prices
(1911) 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct 376.
'Act of July 2, I8go, ch. 647 (26 Stat at L. 209).
' (I9,9) 250 U. S. 300, 39 Sup. Ct. 465. See (392o) 29 YALE LAW JouRNAL,
365. See also (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNA., 505.
(192O) 252 U. S. 85, 40 Sup. Ct 251. See (192o) 29 YALE LAW J OURNAL, 696.
(1921) 256 U. S. 208, 41 Sup. Ct 45I.
'See supra note i.
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are against public policy arobused a considerable degree of adverse criti-
cism.8  The doctrine was nevertheless firmly adhered to. The decision
in the Schrader case that the making of such contracts was an indictable
offence under the Sherman Act, was the next step. The chief difficulty
encountered in reaching this decision was the Colgate case, which was
distinguished, however, in that the indictment,. as interpreted by the
trial court, failed to charge the existence of contracts or agreements,
express or implied, between the manufacturer and the dealers. But the
Sherman Act declares unlawful not only contracts but combinations and
conspiracies in restraint of interstate commerce, and in another section,
monopolies and attempts to monopolize. One person cannot, of course,
combine or conspire. But one person can monopolize or attempt to
monopolize. And if the dealers acquiesce, whether from willingness or
from fear, the end desired by the manufacturer and condemned by the
Supreme Court is attained. Indeed, if the defendant manufacturer in
the Schrader case actually succeeded in maintaining standard resale
prices, it was not by means of the contracts with his dealers, which were
void and unenforceable, but by the other method of refusing to sell to
non-complying dealers. 10 Notwithstanding -this logical difficulty, the
8 In that case the court quoted' Justice Lurton (then Circuit Judge) in the
opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of John D. Park & Sons Co.
v. Samuel B. Hartman (19o7) 153 Fed. 24, 42, as follows: "Next, all competition
between retailers is destroyed, for each such retailer can obtain his supply only
by signing one of the uniform contracts prepared for retailers, whereby he cove-
nants .... not to sell at less than a standard price named in the agreement.
Thus a combination between the manufacturer, the wholesalers and the retailers to
maintain prices and stifle competition has been brought about." 220 U. S. 373,
399, 31 Sup. Ct 376, 381.
This reasoning would clearly be sufficient to sustain the principle that such con-
tracts are against public policy where the commodity is a necessity of which the
particular manufacturer has some considerable degree of monopoly. But where
there is no monopoly of the product, there is nothing to prevent the operation of
the usual economic laws in establishing a fair price. The manufacturer necessarily
has a monopoly of his own brand of the product; but his brand must come into
competition -with other brands of other manufacturers. It is a curious doctrine
that it is against public policy for him to fix the retail price of his own goods.
The door is thereby opened to methods of competition among retailers which are
in the long run truly harmful to the public-predatory price cutting for the
purpose of driving the weaker rivals out of business. See Kales, Contracts &
Combinations it; Restraint of Trade (1918) ch. 4. See also dissenting opinion of
Justice Holmes in the Miles case, supra note 2, at p. 409, 31 Sup. Ct at p. 385.
For the arguments on both sides from the economic point of view, see Murchison,
Resale Price Maintenance (1gig) Columbia University Studies in Political Science,
Vol. 82, No. 2; Gleick, Price Maintenance (1917) 24 CASE & COMmENT, 193.
'See Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co. (1918) 246 U. S.
8, 21, 38 Sup. Ct 257, 259.
" "It is a little difficult, logically, to preceive why an invalid stipulation in a
contract could become a contract in restraint of trade, although one can readily
see why a combination or conspiracy using invalid agreements might result in such
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Supreme Court bound itself to what the trial court called a "distinction
without a difference":" where contracts or agreements, express or
implied, existed, as in the Schrader case, the Sherman Act was violated;
where they did not exist, as in the Colgate case, the Sherman Act was
not violated.
In the Beechnut case it was expressly stipulated in the agreed state-
ment of facts upon which the decision was based, "that the merchandis-
ing conduct of respondent heretofore defined and as herein involved
does not constitute a contract or contracts whereby resale prices are
fixed, maintained, and enforced." As pointed out by Mr. Justice
McReynolds, dissenting, this brought the case dearly within the Colgate
decision and clearly outside the Schrader decision. Yet the court sus-
tained an order prohibiting the continuance of the conduct in question,
without overruling or questioning the Colgate case, or recognizing any
inconsistency in the two positions. The basis of the decision was that
the methods used by the manufacturer in the instant case were "quite
as effectual as agreements, express or implied, intended to accomplish
the same purpose" 2 -- a rather delayed recognition of what the trial
court had pointed out ih the Schrader case.'"
The Supreme Court doctrine that the maintenance of standard resale
prices of branded products is against public policy, although the manu-
facturer has no monopoly of the kind of products involved, is open to
a violation [of the Sherman Act]." United States v. A. Schrader's Son, InW.
(192o N. D. Ohio) 264 Fed. 175, ISO.
""The tacit acquiescence of the wholesalers and retailers in the prices thus
fixed is the equivalent for all practical purposes of an express agreement."
United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., supra at p. 183. The court then reasoned
in substance as follows: The Colgate case recognizes the manufacturer's privilege
of refusing to sell to one who does not observe suggested resale prices. It is a
distinction without a difference to say that he may do so by subterfuges and devices
without violating the Sherman Act; and yet if he had done the same thing in the
form of a written agreement he would be guilty of a violation of the law. "Mani-
festly, therefore, the decision in the Dr. Miles Medical case must rest upon some
other ground than the mere fact that there were agreements between the manu-
facturers and the wholesalers..... .. There must be a purpose to create and
maintain a monopoly, and the acts charged in the indictment must be sufficient to
show that there was effective means adopted to create and maintain a monopoly."
Since no such monopoly or attempt at a monopoly was charged, the District
Court sustained a demurrer to the indictment. This decision the Supreme Court
reversed, saying: "It seems unnecessary to dwell upon the obvious difference
between the situation presented when a manufacturer merely indicates his wishes
concerning prices and declines further dealings with all who fail to observe them,
and one where he enters into agreements-whether express or implied from a
course of dealing or other circumstances-with all customers throughout the
different States which undertake to bind them to fixed resale prices." 252 U. S.
at p. 99, 4o Sup. Ct at p. 253.
"42 Sup. Ct. at p. 155.
13 See supra note ii. See also No-rs (iig) 19 CoL. L. REv. 149, and see also
N0ToS (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 966.
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question.' 4 But once having adopted this doctrine, the decision in the
Beechnut case simply carries it to its logical conclusion. No sound
distinction can be based upon the presence or absence of "contracts" or
"agreements."' 5 Furthermore, there is no inconsistency in recognizing
the bare privilege of refusing to sell in general, while denying that it
can be exercised as a means toward what has been assumed to be an
undesirable end. The logical difficulty of the present decision lies in
the continued, unqualified support of the Colgate case, and in the neces-
sary inference that a manufacturer still has the privilege, which the court
said he had in that case, "to exercise his own discretion as to those with
whom he would deal, and to announce the circumstances under which
he would refuse to sell,"' 6 although the "circumstance" announced be
failure of the- dealer to comply with specified resale prices. The only
distinction which the court suggests is that "the Beechnut system'
7
goes far beyond the simple refusal to sell goods to persons who will not
" supra note 8. See also dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Iolmes in the
principal case: "So far as the Sherman Act is concerned I had supposed that its
policy was aimed against attempts to create a monopoly in the doers of the con-
denmed act or to hinder competition with them. Of course there can be nothing of
that sort here. The respondent already has the monopoly of its own goods with
the full assent of the law, and no one can compete with it with regard to those
goods, which are the only ones concerned. .... I cannot see how it is 'unfair
competition to say to those to whom the respondent sells and to the world, you
can have my goods only on the terms that I propose, when the existence of any
competition in dealing with them depends upon the respondent's will." 42 Sup. Ct.
at p. 155. And as suggested by Mr. Justice McReynolds: "If a manufacturer
should limit his customers to consumers, he would thereby destroy competition
among dealers, but neither they nor the public could complain." 42 Sup. Ct. at p.
156.
"5See NOTES (1919) ig CoL. L. R~v. i49; Norzs (1920) 33 HARv. L. REV. 966.
But Cf. Brown, The Right to Reftue to Sell (1916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 194.
From the opinion of the court in the principal case at p. 155.
The nature of the system condemned appears from the opinion of the court
giving approval to an order requiring "the company to cease and desist from
carrying into effect its so-called Beech-Nut policy by co-operative methods in
which the respondent and its distributors, customers, and agents undertake to
prevent others from obtaining the company's products at less than the prices
designated by it-(i) by the practice of reporting the names of dealers who do
not observe such resale prices; (2) by causing dealers to be enrolled upon lists of
undesirable purchasers who are not to be supplied with the products of the
company unless and until they have given satisfactory apsurances of their purpose
to maintain such designated prices in the future; (3) by employing salesmen or
agents to assist in such plan by reporting dealers who do not observe such resale
prices, and giving orders of purchase only to such jobbers and wholesalers as sell
at the suggested prices and refusing to give such orders to dealers who sell at
less than such prices, or who sell to others who sell at less than such prices; (4)
by utilizing numbers and symbols marked upon cases containing their products
with a view to ascertaining the names of the dealers who sell the company's
products at less than the suggested prices, or who sell to others who sell at less than
such prices in order to prevent such dealers from obtaining the products of the
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sell at stated prices, which in the Colgate case was held to be within the
legal rights of the producer."' 8  But whatever the present status of the
Colgate case, one thing seems clear-the passage to the legal methods
of that case, which the court has assumed to preserve between the Scylla
and Charybdis of the subsequent decisions, is narrow and dangerous,
and the manufacturer who would take advantage of the passage will
need a truly skilful pilot.
NULLIFICATION OF THE REFERENDUM BY. LEGISLATIVE DECLARATION OF
EMERGENCY
Shall the Supreme Court say that the Legislature has deliberately told
a falsehood? This problem is troubling several states in connection
with their initiative and referendum constitutional amendments, which
provide that emergency measures necessary for the immediate preserva-
tion of the public peace, health, and safety shall not be subject to the
referendum.' The issue is whether the court may go behind a legis-
lative declaration of emergency, attached to an act, so as to decide
whether the act is really referable to the people or not.
A distinction of some value may be drawn between a declaration of
emergency that merely abridges the time in which a statute shall go into
effect and one the purpose of which is also to prevent a popular ref eren-
dum.2 Many state constitutions provide that all laws shall take effect
company; or (5) by utilizing any other equivalent co-operative means of accom-
plishing the maintenance of prices fixed by the company." 42 Sup. Ct at p. 155.
It is difficult to see anything in the methods enumerated more unlawful than in
the "simple" methods of the Colgate Company. As put by Mr. Justice McRey-
nolds, dissenting: "Having the undoubted right to sell to whom it will, why should
respondent be enjoined from writing down the names of dealers regarded as
undesirable customers? Nor does there appear to be any wrong in maintaining
special salesmen who turn over orders to selected wholesalers and who honestly
investigate and report to their principal the treatment accorded its products by
dealers. Finally, as respondent may freely select customers, how can injury
result from marks on packages which enable it to trace their movements? The
privilege to sell or not to sell at will surelyr involves the right by open and honest
means to ascertain what selected customers do with goods voluntarily sold to
them." 42 Sup. Ct at p. 156.
is42 Sup. Ct. at p. 154. (Italics ours.)
' The following is a typical constitutional provision: "The second power
reserved by the people is the referendum, and it may be ordered on any act,
bill, law or any part thereof, passed by the Legislature, except such laws as may
be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or
safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions."
Wash. Const. see. I, art. 2, subd. b, amendment 7.
'The first merely increases the enacting power of the state legislature; the
second operates in addition to infringe upon the reserved power of the people to
nullify the act by a referendum. State v. Stewart (1920) 57 Mont. 144, 187 Pac.
641. See (1920) 5 MiNN. L. Rav. 82. As to the effect of one clause upon the
other, see In re Interrogatories by the Governor (i919) 66 Coo. 319, i81 Pac. I97.
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ninety days after the adjournment of the legislative session, except those
containing a declaration of emergency and passed by a two-thirds vote
of each house of the legislature. The fact that the state constitution
usually specifically provides that the legislative declaration of an
emergency shall be conclusive in these cases is some evidence that,
without this constitutional provision, such a declaration is not con-
clusive.
Relying on the long-established rule that the existence of a public
necessity is a matter of legislative policy,3 cases have held that whether
an act is an emergency measure, as declared by the legislature, is not
a question for judicial review.4 In State, ex rel. Durbin, v. Smith
(1921, Ohio) 133 N. E. 457, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held, by
a bare majority not wholly agreeing with each other, that the same
rule applies in determining whether or not an act of the legislature is
subject to the referendum. 5 A statute reorganizing certain state
departments" had been passed and had been declared by the legisla-
ture to be an "emergency law", thus accelerating the date of its oper-
ation and preventing a referendum. 7 The court denied an applica-
3I Willoughby, Constitution (igio) ig; Scott v. Frazier (1gig, D. N. D.) 258
Fed. 669.
"Kadderly v. Portland (19o3) 44 Or. ii8, 74 Pac. 71o. "The existence of such
necessity is a question of fact, which the General Assembly in the exercise of
its legislative functions must determine; and under the constitutional provision
above quoted, the fact cannot be reviewed, called into question, nor be determined
by the courts. It is a question of which the Legislature alone is the judge, and
when it determines that fact to exist, its action is final." Per Gabbert, C. J.,
Van Kleeck v. Ramer (I916) 62 Colo. 4, 10, 156 Pac. i1o8, iiio. State v. Bacon
(19O1) 14 S. D. 394, 85 N. W. 6o5, cited by most of the cases as an authority for
the conclusiveness of the legislative declaration, has been overruled. Hodges v.
Snyder (ig2o) 43 S. D. 166, 178 N. W. 575.
'The majority opinion is per curiam. One of the dissenting opinions is respect-
ful of the majority, though perhaps not of the legislature: "Cheerfully conceding
that the majority have conscientiously arrived at a different conclusion, I have
felt it my duty to place this dissent upon the record in the hope that it might to
some extent operate to check furthe" tendency by the General Assembly to dis-
regard the plain provisions of our Constitution, however vain and fanciful that
hope may be." (at p. 473) Of the other dissenting opinions, one can scarcely
say as much: "The dominant portion of the court has robbed the sacred Consti-
tution;" "it has ruthlessly trampled under foot;" "the outrage which has been
perpetrated upon the people;" "my brethren of the majority have simply erected
a smoke screen; " "I submit the foregoing to the candid and conscientious
judgment of the people of Ohio ;" "I fear this is another Dred Scott Decision."
'Described by the dissenting Chief Justice as "a ripper bill."
" The Ohio Constitution provides that "emergency laws necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, shall go into immedi-
ate effect. Such emergency laws upon a yea and nay vote must receive the vote
of two-thirds of all the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly,
and the reasons for such necessity shall be set forth in one section of the law,
which section shall be passed only upon a yea and nay vote, upon a separate roll
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tion for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to set
the referendum machinery in motion.
In the instant case there was no question that the subject matter of
the act was within the powers of the General Assembly. The act
had been duly passed by the required two-thirds vote; and the rea-
sons for declaring it to be an emergency law had been properly set out
at length in a separate section adopted by a separate vote. The ques-
tion was as to the legal operation of the legislative declaration that an
emergency existed making the act "necessary for the immediate pre-
servation of the public peace, health, or safety."
The answer to this required the consideration of three subsidiary
questions. First, was the court being asked to pass upon the consti-
tutional powers of the General Assembly? Secondly, do the courts
have power to review the legislative declaration of the fact of an
emergency? Thirdly, can the court say that the declaration of an
emergency in the instant case was false beyond any reasonable doubt?
The first of these must clearly be ansxiered in the affirmative.8
call thereon. The laws mentioned in this section shall not be subject to the
referendum." Sec. I, art. 2.
'Two of the dissenting judges deny this; but they demonstrate their own
error. Thus Marshall, C. J., at p. 462, says: "no question of constitutional power
is involved .... For the purpose of this controversy it may be admitted that the
act is constitutional. The majority opinion has laboriously raised a man of
straw and then pretended to knock him over." ". . . . it is not claimed that any
part of this law transcends the legislative power conferred b'y the constitution."
But elsewhere he says: "the emergency clause .... is no part of its operative
provisions. It is merely intended as a statement of reasons to justify [empower]
the Legislature it making the provisions of the law immediately operative, thereby
forestalling a referendum." And again, "If the executive branch of the govern-
ment should attempt to execute the provisions of the law immediately after its
passage, without such law having a separate section declaring the reasons ...
[or with such a section declaring false reasons, if the views of the Chief justice
are followed] such attempted execution could be enjoined, and a constitutional
question would be presented, because it would involve a question of legislative
power, and not a question of legislative policy."
Wanamaker, J., says: "We of the minority do not claim that there is any
conflict between the provisions of the act known as the Administrative Code and
the Constitution. . . . The only question here is as to when this act, presumed
to be legal, presumed to be constitutional, is to go into effect." (at p. 475) It
will be observed that the learned judge, contrary to his own assertion, does claim
that the legislature provides that the act shall be operative at once and that the
constitution declares that it shall not. This looks like "conflict."
Johnson, J., takes the correct view that not only are the legislative powers of
the General Assembly involved, but so also are the legislative powers of the
people. He says: "I agree with the majority that, where there is doubt as to
the constitutionality of a statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of its
validity, and the legislative power conferred upon the General Assenibly should
in such case be upheld. So in this case the legislative power conferred upon the
people by the Constitution should be upheld; and, where there is doubt as to
the sufficiency of reasons or declarations for taking away this constitutional
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The constitutional validity of the statute, although not its wisdom or
policy, .was being determined. Can the General Assembly make such
an act operative after the expiration of ninety days? This is a ques-
tion of constitutional power; but it was not involved in the case, and
such power was not doubted. Can the Assembly make such an act
operative before the expiration of ninety days? This is equally a ques-
tion of constitutional power; it was involved in the case and it was
bitterly contested. The majority therefore thought the court dis-
abled by another provision of the constitution declaring that statutes
should not be held unconstitutional against the dissent of more than
one member of the court.9
The second question would be answered in the affirmative by five of
the seven members of the court.10 No attempt will be made here
to reconcile the conflicting decisions. Each case must turn upon the
interpretation of specific constitutional language. It will merely be
pointed out that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness will not be
greatly jeopardized by 'a decision either way. Even though we
regard the determination of the facts constituting an emergency as
a judicial matter, the Ohio Constitution might reasonably be con-
strued as committing it to the discretion of the General Assembly,
such determination requiring a "two-thirds -vote of all the members
elected to each branch," a special roll call on the section declaring
an emergency, and a statement of the reasons requiring such action.
These unusual safeguards would hardly be necessary if the Supreme
Court has the final determining power. Also, the people of Ohio
evinced a pretty strong desire to curb the power of the Supreme Court
to declare statutes unconstitutional." Perhaps they were content with
their biennial referendum on the merits of their representatives as
a sufficient check on the abuse of legislative power to declare an
right of the people, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the constitutional
privilege which belongs to the people." (at p. 473)
"'No law shall be held -unconstitutional' and void by the Supreme Court
without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges." Sec. 2, art. 4.
In the instant case two of the judges (and apparently only two) were fully
convinced of the constitutional power of the General Assembly to make the law
operative at once. Thus did the constitution-makers of Ohio fall between two
stools. In their distrust of their own voluntarily-chosen legislators, they limited
their powers by the referendum provisions. In their distrust of their own
chosen judges, they so curbed the judicial power as to disable the Supreme
Court (Johnson, J., contra) from enforcing the referendum limitations on the
legislators.
10 The court had unanimously so held in a previous case. County of Miami v.
Dayton (,915) 92 Ohio 'St. 2,5, 11o N. E. 726. See in accord: State v. Meath
(1915) 84 Wash. 302, 147 Pac. ii; State v. Hinkle (1921, Wash.) 198 Pac. 535;
State v. Becker (1921, Mo.) 233 S. W. 641; Fogelsville, etc. v. Pa. Light Co.(I92I, Pa.) 114 Atl. 822. For cases contra, see supra note 2. See also (1921)
31 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 2o4.
' See supra note 9.
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emergency.12 However great may be the merits of our theory of
the separation of powers, our constitutions do not and can not carry it
out in every detail.
The third question was answered by the majority in the negative.
It must be admitted that the effort in this respect was labored. The
dissenting judges were more successful on this than on the other
points. They make the "reasons" stated by the legislature appear
extremely weak, if not even ridiculous.
Dissenting opinions render a valuable service to the law and to the
community. We are now well accustomed to judicial disagreement
and to five to four (or four to three) decisions on constitutional
matters of high importance. Nevertheless, a mild regret may be
expressed when judicial opinions are in. violent disharmony, "like
sweet bells jangled, out of tune and harsh."
DAYLIGHT SAVING LAWS
The repeal of the Federal Daylight Saving Law' has occasioned such
conflicting local regulations that the resulting exasperation may present
an interesting legal question. "Daylight saving" has an unfortunately
varying effect upon the welfare of different classes and occupations.
2
A blessing to the confined office worker, it is anathema to his brother on
the farm. It is thus very largely a local question, even though our
industrial organization is so complex that a change in the setting of
John Clerk's alarm clock sometimes causes a change in the hour of
Tom Farmer's rising. The preponderance of urban or rural voters may
settle the state policy in the matter; and no court would deny the valid-
ity of a state law without such extreme oppressiveness in application as to
invite general non-compliance with its terms.8 If convenient to the
general public, its constitutionality may be assumed.4
' It has been argued that to permit the legislature to determine the existence
of its own power to prevent a referendum is to nullify the provision for a
referendum altogether. This is too strong a statement. A court is often
required to determine the existence of its own jurisdictional power by a deter-
mination of the operative facts upon which that power depends.
"Act of Aug. 2o, 1919 (41 Stat. at L. 28o).
'See Daylight Saving-A Brief for Debate (917) 9o THE INDEPENDENT, 249,
collecting references to various views; see also Boston Chamber of Commerce,
Report of Special Committee on Daylight Saving (1917).
'The statutes so far passed may be put into three classes: First, those which
established daylight saving time throughout the state. Such a statute has been
passed in Massachusetts. Mass. Acts, 1921, ch. 145. Second, those providing
for local option, the state of NTew York alone having passed such a law. N. Y.
Laws, 1921, ch. 7o. Third, those forbidding the observance of any other than
the regular standard of time. Connecticut, Vermont, and New Hampshire have
passed such laws. Conn. Pub. Acts, 1921, ch. 37; Vt. Laws, 1921, No. 261; N. H.
Laws, 1921, ch. 15. Similar legislation is pending in the legislatures of Rhode
Island and Kentucky.
" See Commonwealth v. Nolan (1920) 189 Ky. 34, 224 S. W. 5o6. To illustrate:
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Individual cities are more likely than are the states to pass such
ordinances,5 due to municipal pressure and to the hostility of the "farm
bloc" in the state legislature. In the absence of both a prohibitory
statute and a state daylight saving law, the constitutionality of these
city ordinances is not questionable.6 Where a state law has been
passed, however, even without a prohibition of "local option" in the
matter, the inconsistency of a municipal ordinance would seem to make
it impossible to sustain. 7  The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld such a
measure8 under the "home rule" provision of the state constitution 9
holding that the ordinance was applicable to purely municipal affairs
and neatly dodging any reference to the obvious intent of the city
council to nullify the state law within the limits of the city. Without
such a constitutional sanction, however, the decision should have been
to the contrary.0 If a determined legislature has expressly forbid-
den local daylight saving, the situation ensuing upon a city's defiance"
is more interesting from the standpoint of administration than from that
of constitutionality. 12
New York's local option laws might have resulted in confusion by reason of the
differing actions of the various cities and towns. Could it be denied that if the
legislature believed that the great majority of the people of the state would be
greatly benefited by such a law, it could not require all to conform to a new
standard of time? On public convenience as a valid ground for the exercise
of the police power, see Lake Shore, etc. Ry. v. Ohio (899) 173 U. S. 285, 19
Sup. Ct. 465; State v. Wilson (1917) 1o1 Kan. 789, 168 Pac. 679; Sabre v.
Rutland Ry. (1913) 86 Vt. 347, 85 Atl. 693.5Among the many cities that have adopted the Daylight Saving Plan the
ordinances of the following have been examined: Columbus, Ohio, Ord. No. 31,
924, Mar. 6, 192o; Cincinnati, Ohio, Ord. No. 75, 192o; Providence, R. I., Ord.
No. 212, ch. 285, 1921; Hartford, Conn., Ord. No. 454, 192o; Pittsburgh, Pa.,
Ord. No. 420, 119 ; Philadelphia, Pa.; Buffalo, N. Y.; Newark, N. J.; Jersey
City, N. J.; Chicago, Ill.; New York City.
"The enactment of this ordinance is immediately necessary for the preserva-
tion of the public health." (Ordinance of City of Buffalo, N. Y.) See also the
preamble of those of Jersey City, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia. 2 Dillon, Muni-
cipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) secs. 591, 592.
i Dillon, op. cit. sec. 237; 2ibid, sec. 6oi. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations
(7th ed. 19o3) 278, 279; City of St. Louis v. Anteln (1911) 235 Mo. 669, 139
S. W. 249.
'State, ex. rel. Cist, v. City of Cincinnati (192o) ioi Ohio St. 354, 129 N. E. 595.
'Ohio Const. art. 18, sec. 3. State law covering time regulation, Ohio Gen.
Code, 1921, secs. 5979, 5980.
"See supra note 7. Ex parte Daniel (1921, Calif.) 192 Pac. 442.
The City of Hartford, Conn., adopted daylight saving in 1921 despite the
state law, supra note 3.
""Municipal corporations are mere instrumentalities of the state for the
more convenient administration of local government. Their powers are such as
the legislature may confer and they may be enlarged, abridged or entirely with-
drawn at its pleasure," per Waite, C. J., in Meriwether v. Garrett (i88o) 1O2
U. S. 472. See also, I Dillon, op. cit. sec. 98; Chalstran v. Bd. of Education
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From a conscious fear of either legislative or judicial interference'3
the city framers of such ordinances usually have been careful to limit
their mandatory operation to municipal departments,14 adding a pious
wish that others may feel inclined to make their clocks agree with the
one on the town hall. 5 A very recent ordinance has cast aside such
precatory prudence, and commands obedience.,1 If it is indicative
of a new tendency, the courts will soon be compelled to review a ques-
tion that needs to be answered with certainty, if only because of the
disastrous effect of the present chaos upon daily commercial dealing.
(igio) 244 Ill. 470, 91 N. E. 712; Pershing County v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court
(igig, Nov.) 183 Pac. 34.
'A resolution declaring that: "The City of Hartford is and is hereby declared
to be in a state of rebellion against the laws of the United States and the laws
of the State of Connecticut in regard to standard time," was rejected. Laws
of The House, Conn. Assembly, April 2o, 1921. A bill offered as a substitute
and providing penalties for such violation by municipalities was also rejected.
Laws of the House, April 28, 192i.
" The ordinance of the City of Buffalo, N. Y., is typical. After declaring the
new standard of time, the concluding requirement is that, "all courts, public
offices, and legal and official proceedings shall be regulated hereby."
"The Chicago, Ill. ordinance reflects this attitude. Section 3 reads: "All
persons residing within the city and all persons, firms or corporations doing
business within the city are hereby requested to set and run any and all
clocks.... in accordance with the official time."
""That in order- to promote unifbrmity and to secure to the citizens and
inhabitants of the City of Philadelphia the benefits of daylight saving in the
said months .... such standard of time is hereby designated to be conformed to
by the said citizens and inhabitants by setting forward and retarding their
watches, clocks and timepieces at the times and in the manner provided for in
the first section hereof, and by governing themselves in their daily business and
affairs in accordance with the standard of time fixed by this ordinance." Ordin-
ance of Philadelphia, sec. 3, approved March 2, 1922.
